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THE EXIT STRUCTURE OF
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES
D. Gordon Smith*
Today, many biotechnology firms are using strategic alliances to
contract with other companies. In this article, Professor Smith con-
tends that the governance structure of these alliances-specifically, the
"contractual board" -provides an integrated restraint on opportun-
ism. While an alliance agreement's exit structure could provide a
check on opportunism by allowing the parties to exit at will, such exit
provisions also can be used opportunistically. Most alliance agree-
ments, therefore, provide for contractual "lock in" of the alliance
partners, with only limited means of exit. Lock in, of course, raises its
own concerns, and Professor Smith contends that the contractual
board-which is composed of representatives from each alliance
partner, each wielding equal power-addresses these concerns about
opportunism via the potential for deadlock.
I. INTRODUCTION
Alliances have become a central feature of modem business. Al-
though not inherently tied to a particular industry, alliances seem to be
particularly common among biotechnology firms,' where alliances often
involve a small research firm matching up with a large pharmaceutical
company Despite increasing attention from economists, sociologists,
* Professor of Law, University of Wisconsin Law School. Thanks to Henry Butler and John
Coates for insightful comments, to Mary Ann Brow, John Kidwell, and John Ohnesorge for helpful
discussions, and to Christina Fredette for timely and effective research assistance.
1. See, e.g., Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empiri-
cal Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry, 46 J. INDUS. ECON. 125, 129 (1998) (presenting data on the
increasing number of biotechnology alliances). Biotechnology alliances often involve research and
development collaboration between a large pharmaceutical company and a small biotechnology com-
pany. In these relationships, the smaller company often engages in the initial research and transfers
responsibility to the larger company as development progresses. As will be discussed below, this tem-
poral division creates special risks for the smaller company that must be addressed by the relational
contract.
2. See, e.g., David T. Robinson & Toby Stuart, Network Effects in the Governance of Strategic
Alliances in Biotechnology I (Mar. 1, 2000) (observing that "strategic partnerships have become the
most significant source of external funding for the research activities of the young firms in the indus-
try") (Working Paper, on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
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and management scholars,3 strategic alliances have received only modest
attention from legal scholars.4 This article brings the learning of corpo-
rate law scholars to bear on one aspect of the governance of strategic al-
liances.
For purposes of this article, "alliances" are long-term, cooperative,
relational contracts among two or more firms, and are characterized by
nonfinancial investments and a profit interest by all parties.5 Joint ven-
tures, by contrast, involve the creation of a separate legal entity, and such
structures are excluded from this study.6 Transaction-cost economics has
taught us to divide the world into markets and hierarchies, but alliances
lie somewhere in between.7
In this middle region, the potential for opportunism is high, and al-
liance agreements are structured with an eye toward combating oppor-
tunism through the detailed specification of rights and obligations and
the mutual staging of investments. Alliance agreements also contain
mechanisms to regulate exit. In most instances, the termination provi-
sions allow parties to exit an alliance only after a specified period of time
or "for cause," which might include a material breach of the agreement, a
change in control of the counterparty, or insufficient progress on the pro-
ject.6 By effectively locking partners into the alliance relationship, these
termination provisions create incentives to mitigate opportunism.
3. See, e.g., MARK DE ROND, STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AS SOCIAL FACTS: BUSINESS,
BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (2003).
4. The Case Western Reserve Law Review published a short symposium entitled The Role of
Lawyers in Strategic Alliances, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 857 (2003).
5. Scholars have not reached a consensus on the definition of "strategic alliance," but from a
legal standpoint, nothing turns on this definition because strategic alliances are not subject to special
regulation. George Dent defines "strategic alliance" as a "sustained relationship in which the agreed
performance of each party is complex and largely autonomous and each party has a profit interest."
George W. Dent, Jr., Gap Fillers and Fiduciary Duties in Strategic Alliances, 57 Bus. LAW. 55, 56
(2001); see also Ranjay Gulati, Does Familiarity Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for
Contractual Choice in Alliances, 38 ACAD. MGMT. J. 85, 85 (1995) (describing an arrangement
"whereby two or more firms agree to pool their resources to pursue specific market opportunities");
David T. Robinson, Strategic Alliances and the Boundaries of the Firm 2 (Nov. 15, 2001) ("A strategic
alliance is an agreement between legally distinct entities that provides for the sharing of costs and
benefits of some (significantly costly) mutually beneficial activity.") (Working Paper, on file with the
University of Illinois Law Review).
6. Cf. Robinson, supra note 5, at 2 ("A joint venture differs from a strategic alliance in that the
contracting parties form a new, distinct organization to administer the activities of the alliance. Since a
new entity is formed, control rights are more clearly delineated ex ante, and the transaction more
closely resembles a merger."). Rachelle Sampson refers to alliances as "pooling contracts" and distin-
guishes these from "equity joint ventures." She writes, "[a] pooling contract is a contractual arrange-
ment where partner firms combine their capabilities for the purposes of collaborative R&D, but do
not form a separate legal entity for the alliance." Rachelle C. Sampson, The Cost of Misaligned Gov-
ernance in R&D Alliances, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 484, 487 (2004).
7. As noted by David Robinson, "[a]lliances lie somewhere in the middle of an organizational
spectrum, which at one end reside purely anonymous market transactions and at the other extreme
reside integrated hierarchies." Robinson, supra note 5, at 2; see also, Sampson, supra note 6, at 488
("On the market to hierarchy continuum of organizational forms, the pooling contract is close to mar-
ket, while the equity joint venture is more hierarchical and closer to internal organization.").
8. David T. Robinson & Toby E. Stuart, Financial Contracting in Biotech Strategic Alliances 28
(Aug. 31, 2002) (Working Paper, on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
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This article focuses on one aspect of the exit structure that has been
largely overlooked in the prior literature on alliances: the contractual
board. Many alliance contracts create a contractual board-usually
called the "management committee."9 At first glance these committees
look like a corporate board of directors, but closer examination reveals
that they have a quite different function. While corporate boards of di-
rectors are primarily about centralized decision making, the contractual
boards formed by most alliance agreements are concerned with oppor-
tunism prevention. One mechanism by which management committees
police opportunism is by permitting the parties to deadlock, a method
borrowed from the governance of closely held corporations.
Management committees typically are assigned the task of monitor-
ing the alliance activities and shaping ongoing developments. The com-
mittees are comprised of representatives of each side, usually in equal
numbers, but the absolute numbers are not so important, since unanimity
is the norm. Because most alliances are comprised of only two parties,
deadlocks are a real possibility." Given that alliances usually do not
provide for easy dissolution, the deadlocks are dealt with according to
the terms of the contracts, which ordinarily include a dispute resolution
mechanism. One purpose of management committees, therefore, is to
provide an exit option. The price of exit is the cost of the deadlock pro-
cedures.
Part II of this article describes the problem of opportunism in alli-
ances. Part III discusses the importance of exit. Part IV examines the
contractual board and its role in forcing (or threatening to force) dead-
lock as a means of mitigating opportunism.
II. OPPORTUNISM IN ALLIANCES
Alliances are relational contracts' among two or more firms. The
relationships are intended to last multiple years, 2 though failure rates
reportedly are high. 3 The logic of transaction-cost economics supports
9. Id. at 24 ("One of the most common features of alliance contracts is the reliance on project-
level monitoring based on research committees, as opposed to board-level control.").
10. Cf. George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 Bus. LAW. 45, 48 (2002) ("To
prevent opportunism, partners often share control equally, but they then need devices to resolve dead-
locks. These devices must be designed so that neither party is tempted to force a deadlock in order to
reap one-sided benefits.").
11. Baker et al. define "relational contract" to mean, "an agreement between the parties that is
so rooted in their shared experience that it cannot be enforced by a court, and so must be enforced by
the parties' concerns for their reputations." George Baker et. al., Relational Contracts in Strategic Al-
liances 16 (Feb. 26, 2002), available at http://www.nbcr.org/books/stragali/baker.pdf (Working Paper,
on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
12. Id. at 14 ("[A]lliances are not one-shot transactions, but rather involve continual interactions
spanning multiple years.").
13. See Bruce Kogut, The Stability of Joint Ventures: Reciprocity and Competitive Rivalry, 38 J.
INDUS. ECON. 183, 183 (1989) (presenting "strong evidence that joint ventures are highly unstable").
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the notion that firms pursue joint ventures rather than alliances when
contracting hazards are high. 4 This section explores the nature of oppor-
tunism in the alliance context.
Opportunism is a familiar concept in legal and economic studies.
The most quoted definition of opportunism belongs to Oliver William-
son, who characterized it as "a condition of self-interest seeking with
guile." 5 The distinctive feature of this definition is the notion of "guile,"
which Williamson describes as "lying, stealing, cheating, and calculated
efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse."' 6 In
the more recent economic literature, opportunism is typically condensed
into "shirking" and "cheating."' 7 In the strategic alliance context, two
forms of "cheating" are most prominent: stealing" and holding up.'9
The temptation to act opportunistically in the alliance setting has
several sources. Bruce Kogut suggests that "[vientures are likely to be
characterized by competitive rivalry over the residual claims .... over
control of the operating management of the assets, or concerns over the
loss of technology and brand labels."2 The concern over technology loss
was central to Joanne Oxley's examination of appropriability hazards,
which she traced to "weak property rights, as they apply to transactions
involving technology transfer within interfirm alliances."'" Oxley argues
further that "'appropriability hazards' can be traced to difficulties in
adequately specifying payoff-relevant activities, monitoring the execu-
However, de Rond rightly observes that "the literature lacks a precise and consistent definition of col-
laborative success and failure." DE ROND, supra note 3, at 9.
14. See Gulati, supra note 5, at 89 ("[Flirms use equity alliances when the transaction costs asso-
ciated with an exchange are too high to justify a quasi-market, nonequity alliance."); Joanne E. Oxley,
Appropriability Hazards and Governance in Strategic Alliances: A Transaction Cost Approach, 13 J.L.
EcON. & ORG. 387, 388 (1997) ("In choosing among different interfirm alliance types, the logic of
transaction cost economics suggests that more 'hierarchical' alliances will be chosen for transactions
where contracting hazards are more severe.").
15. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND. HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
IMPLICATIONS 6 (1975).
16. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 47 (1985). Cf Ian
R. Macneil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need for a "Rich Classi-
ficatory Apparatus," 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1018, 1023 n.20 (1981) (describing guile as "taking advantage
of opportunities with little regard for principles or consequences").
17. Daniel S. Nagin, et al., Monitoring, Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Op-
portunistic Behavior in a Field Experiment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 850, 852 (2002). Borrowing from
Dickens, Eric Orts refers to these two categories of behavior as "shirking and sharking." Eric W. Orts,
Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm, 16 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 265, 280 (1998) (sug-
gesting that shirking and sharking are "more limited concepts" than opportunism).
Williamson has a more expansive conception of opportunism than is often employed by other
economists. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 16, at 101 ("Not only are the failures to self-disclose true
attributes ex ante (adverse selection) and true performance ex post (moral hazard) both subsumed un-
der opportunism, but the failure to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth is impli-
cated by opportunism.").
18. Joanne Oxley uses the highfalutin term "appropriability hazards." Oxley, supra note 14, at
388.
19. Conrad S. Ciccotello et al., Research and Development Alliances: Evidence From a Federal
Contracts Repository, 47 J.L. & ECON. 123, 127-28 (2004).
20. Kogut, supra note 13, at 185.
21. Oxley, supra note 14, at 388.
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tion of prescribed activities, and/or enforcing contracts through the
courts."22 Rochelle Sampson focuses on the risks of free-riding (shirking)
and leakage (stealing) of technology. 3
Much of the voluminous scholarship on alliances attempts to exam-
ine the structural mechanisms by which alliance partners address oppor-
tunism. For example, firms tend to choose more hierarchical structures
(including joint ventures) when property rights are difficult to specify,
when the relationship covers multiple products or technologies, or when
more than two alliance partners are involved. 4 In short, hierarchy miti-
gates some forms of transaction costs.
One of the most important sources of moral hazard risk in alliances
is the sequential performance obligation of the partners. This risk is
typically confronted through various contractual mechanisms. For ex-
ample, the larger alliance partner often makes a substantial upfront in-
vestment in the smaller partner.' After this initial investment, staging is
a conspicuous feature of most alliance agreements.26 In addition, each
alliance partner typically owns separate assets, which, though dedicated
to the alliance, are subject to the alliance partner's exclusive control 7 and
revert back to the separate partners upon dissolution.28 Intellectual
22. Id. at 389.
23. Sampson, supra note 6, at 491. Sampson writes, "Concerns over leakage of intellectual prop-
erty may prevent partners from pooling their best technologies and most skilled labor." Id. at 493.
24. Oxley, supra note 14, at 402-06.
25. David Robinson and Toby Stuart have observed that this investment often takes the form of
convertible preferred stock, with terms similar to those used in venture capital investments. Robinson
& Stuart, supra note 8, at 3 (finding equity investments in sixty-five percent of sample alliances). The
form of equity-common versus preferred-was heavily correlated with the nature of the investee
firm. If that firm was a publicly traded company, common stock was the usual form of equity. On the
other hand, if the investee firm was privately held, convertible preferred stock was the predominant
form of investment. Id. at 17. Interestingly, the youngest firms in their sample did not receive equity
backing at all. Id. at 18.
This movement from no equity through preferred stock and to common stock in later-stage compa-
nies leads Robinson and Stuart to conclude that "strategic alliances act as a form of late-stage venture
capital." Id. at 19. While the size of this initial investment does not depend expressly on performance
milestones, later-stage projects are more likely to receive upfront payments. Id. at 21-22. In addition,
the authors found that "centrality"-as measured by past transactions between the alliance partners-
was an important explanatory variable for the size of initial payments:
One interpretation of these results is that R&D [Research and Development] partner firms with
many past alliances are in a stronger bargaining position because they can credibly generate com-
petition among potential clients, thus raising the probability and size of upfront concessions. The
positive effect of centrality on upfront funding is also consistent with the interpretation of central-
ity as a proxy for the R&D partners reputation. Because upfront payments are non-contingent
and thus eligible for misuse, clients are presumably less reluctant to provide them in deals with
R&D partners that have better reputations.
Id. at 22.
26. Robinson & Stuart, supra note 8, at 13 ("Almost all deals make future investment contingent
on achieving certain milestones.").
27. Sampson, supra note 6, at 488 ("Decision making in these alliances on all but the most criti-
cal decisions is typically decentralized (i.e., partners make their own judgments on how to best meet
their obligations under the alliance agreement) .... ).
28. How are payments made to alliance partners? Three possibilities: (1) "efficiency wages" are
paid before the state or any decisions are observed; (2) "bribes" are paid after the states are observed,
but before the parties make asset utilization decisions; and (3) "subjective bonuses" are paid depend-
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property also plays a central role in most alliances.29 Most alliance
agreements have extensive provisions allocating ownership over im-
provements or discoveries.
Despite the extensive contractual protections in most alliance
agreements, a number of complicating factors emerge. First, to the ex-
tent that gaps in contractual protections persist, alliances operate in a
space largely devoid of default rules.3" Second, alliances do not obtain
the benefits of hierarchy that are inherent in corporate governance,3
namely, the exercise of centralized control. Finally, given the long-term
goals of most alliances and their uncertain paths, contracts cannot be
drafted with much precision. Because the alliance partners often per-
form discrete tasks, "firms have difficulty assessing partner contributions
and cannot easily infer contributions by examining results, since the link
between effort and results is highly variable. '3 2 And, if the parties them-
selves have difficulty monitoring contractual compliance, courts are even
more handicapped by their insistence upon objective evidence of breach
of contract. In such a contracting context, it is not surprising to find soci-
ologists and legal scholars talking about "norms,"33 "embeddedness,"34
and "trust"35 as mechanisms to mitigate opportunism.
The alliance between Microsoft and Sendo Limited, a smartphone
company from Birmingham, England, illustrates the potential for oppor-
tunism that arises in alliances. The two companies met at the T99 Tele-
com Fair in October 1999 and almost immediately began discussing a
possible alliance to develop a "smartphone" (i.e., a telephone that could
also access the Internet and serve as a personal digital assistant).36 Sendo
was already developing a product called the Z100, and Microsoft was de-
veloping a software product with the code name "Stinger."37
ing on whether the asset utilization decisions are appropriately tailored to the state. Baker et al., supra
note 11, at 16.
29. In Robinson and Stuart's sample of 125 genomics alliances, 113 (ninety percent) involved
licensing agreements. Robinson & Stuart, supra note 8, at 11. The authors interpreted the big per-
centage of licensing agreements as evidence of bargaining power on the part of smaller technology
firms. Id.
30. Dent, supra note 10, at 47-48 (discussing how default rules, like those in the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, fill gaps in incomplete contracts).
31. Id.
32. Sampson, supra note 6, at 491.
33. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, Social Norms: Internalization, Persuasion, and History, 34 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 157 (2000).
34. See, e.g., Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Em-
beddedness, 91 AM. J. Soc. 481 (1985). For a discussion of embeddedness in the context of alliances,
see Ranjay Gulati, Alliances and Networks, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 293,299 (1998).
35. On trust generally, see NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (Tom Burns & Gianfranco
Poggi eds., 1979); Lynne G. Zucker, Production of Trust: Institutional Sources of Economic Structure,
1840-1920, 8 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 53 (1986). For a discussion of trust in the strategic
alliance context, see Dent, supra note 10, at 49-52.
36. Plaintiffs Original Complaint at 5, Sendo Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 502CV282 (E.D. Tex.
filed Dec. 20,2002).
37. For more details on the Microsoft-Sendo relationship, see Andy Reinhardt & Jay Greene,
Death of a Dream, Bus. WK., Feb. 10, 2003, at 44.
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After a year of negotiation, the parties entered into a Strategic De-
velopment and Marketing Agreement (SDMA) and various license
agreements in October 2000.38 In a complaint filed after their relation-
ship deteriorated, Sendo described the primary terms of the SDMA:
The SDMA provided, in part, that: (1) the Sendo Z100 Smart-
phone would be a market leading product; (2) Microsoft would pri-
oritize the Sendo Z100 Smartphone; (3) Microsoft would pay an
amount of money plus a contribution to expenses towards devel-
opment of the Z100; and (4) Microsoft would receive a substantial
percentage share of the Net Revenue from sales of the Z100 as it
had contributed to the development cost.39
In addition, Microsoft promised a future investment in Sendo.4 Mi-
crosoft made that investment of $12 million in May 2001."1 In exchange,
Microsoft received the right to appoint a representative to Sendo's Board
of Directors, which it did in the person of Marc Brown.42 Brown was not
only a director of Sendo, but was head of Microsoft's Corporate Devel-
opment and Strategy Group, which monitored the progress of the rela-
tionship under the SDMA.43
During the ensuing months, development of the Z100 lagged. Ac-
cording to Sendo's complaint, the delays were all part of Microsoft's
plan:
Microsoft's Secret Plan was to plunder the small company of
its proprietary information, technical expertise, market knowledge,
customers, and prospective customers. Microsoft had been unable
to successfully access the wireless market because the major hand-
set manufacturers would not use their [Microsoft's] software. So in-
stead.... Microsoft used Sendo's knowledge and expertise
to... gain direct entry into the burgeoning next generation phone
market and then, after driving Sendo to the brink of bankruptcy,
cut it out of the picture.'
According to Sendo's complaint, Microsoft's interest in Sendo was
part of a "master plan" to dominate the market for mobile handsets.45
Under this version of events, Sendo was attractive to Microsoft for three
reasons: (1) Sendo had employees who were experienced in the technol-
ogy of mobile handsets; (2) Sendo had existing relationships with major
companies who would be the major customers for such handsets; and (3)
Sendo had experience with the technical requirements imposed by carri-
38. Plaintiffs Original Complaint at 6, Sendo Ltd. (No. 502CV282).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 7.
42. Id. at 7,9.
43. Id. at 9.
44. Id. at 4.
45. Id. at 3.
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ers (this was especially important because some of these requirements
were not written). 46
In October 2002, Microsoft announced that it had teamed with High
Tech Computer Corp. to produce a unit similar to the Z100 for Orange, a
British telecommunications company.47 The SPV (which stands for
"Sound, Pictures, Video") was riddled with technical bugs, but Orange
and Microsoft are working on new versions.' In November 2002, Sendo
switched from Microsoft's software to a product made by Symbian Ltd.,
the other main competitor in this industry.49 Symbian is a London-based
consortium owned by the giants of the electronics industry: Nokia, Mo-
torola, Ericsson, Sony-Ericsson, Samsung, Matsushita, Panasonic, Psion,
and Siemens.5 °
On December 20, 2002, Sendo filed a complaint in the United States
District Court in Texarkana, Texas, alleging misappropriation of trade
secrets, unfair competition, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of
contract, among other things.5' Sounds bad, but according to Microsoft,
it sounds much worse than it is. 2 In an Answer and Counterclaim, filed
on February 3, 2003, Microsoft referred to Sendo's account as "fanciful"
and claimed that the failure of the Z100 was the result of Sendo's many
breaches of the SDMA.5 3 Moreover, Microsoft claimed that Sendo mis-
led Microsoft about the true nature of Sendo's finances.54
The Microsoft-Sendo alliance generated classic allegations by Sendo
against Microsoft of shirking (albeit in service to a "secret plan" to ap-
propriate Sendo's technology) and stealing. The parties ultimately set-
tled Sendo's lawsuit to undisclosed terms, and the alliance agreement is
not publicly available. Nevertheless, the case provides an excellent illus-
tration of the risks of opportunism in the alliance setting. The next sec-
tion examines the importance of exit as a means of combating the poten-
tial for such opportunism.
46. Id. at 4.
47. Id. at 14.
48. See, e.g., Tony Hallett, Orange Offers "World's Smallest Smart Phone," (June 8, 2004), at
http://networks.silicon.com/mobile/0,39024665,39121183,00.htm; Orange Hunts Flaws in Microsoft
Product, WALL ST. J. EUR., Jan. 16, 2003, at A7 (regarding the bugs in Microsoft's software).
49. The Sendo alliance was Microsoft's third failed attempt to enter the mobile handset market.
It was the primary investor in Teledesic, the satellite network that ultimately failed in 2002. Then in
2001 Microsoft backed out of a joint venture with Qualcomm. Qualcomm Takes Over Ownership of
Venture With Microsoft Corp., WALL ST. J., Nov. 6, 2001, at A10.
50. See Symbian's website at http://www.symbian.com/about/ownership.html.
51. Sendo's U.S. office is located in Irving, Texas. On February 3, 2003, Microsoft filed a motion
to transfer venue to the Western District of Washington, Microsoft's home state. Defendant's Motion
to Transfer Venue at 1, Sendo Ltd. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 502CV282 (E.D. Tex. filed Feb. 3,2003).
52. Defendant's Answer and Counterclaim, Sendo Ltd v. Microsoft Corp., No. 502CV282 (E.D.
Tex. filed Feb. 3,2003).
53. Id. at 25.
54. Id.
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXIT
The problems of opportunism that lie at the heart of strategic alli-
ances are a familiar feature of the scholarship of business organizations.
In particular, general partnerships and closely held corporations share
the challenge of creating a lasting and cooperative relationship among a
small number of participants."5 In both forms of organization, the poten-
tial for stealing and hold-up loom large, and exit structure plays a crucial
role in regulating the potential for opportunism. 6
The default rule of exit in partnership law is at-will dissolution. 7
Exit, or the threat of exit, is a powerful constraint on opportunism. Like
the two-edged sword, however, exit rights also might be used to act op-
portunistically. 8 In many partnerships, therefore, the default rule is
changed, and the parties agree that the partnership will endure for a par-
ticular term or specified undertaking. Of course, even in such arrange-
ments, the partners are allowed to exit, but if a partner leaves the part-
nership under circumstances not sanctioned by the partnership
agreement, the departing partner may be subject to damages for breach
of contract. The result is a form of "lock in" that attempts to discourage
opportunistic exit. 9
Shareholders in a closely held corporation are also subject to lock
in.' Unlike partners in a partnership for term, however, shareholders do
not have the unilateral power of dissolution. That is, absent contractual
or statutory right, shareholders are not entitled to exit at the time of their
55. John A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed
Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 2 (1977) ("[Tlhe
close corporation is the functional equivalent of the partnership.").
56. For a classic study of exit in the partnership context, see Larry E. Ribstein, A Statutory Ap-
proach to Partner Dissociation, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (1987). With respect to closely held corpora-
tions, see Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organiz-
ers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REv. 387 (2003); Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 55.
57. UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31 (1914), 6 U.L.A. (pt. II) 370 (2001); UNIF. P'SHIP Acr §§ 601, 602
(1997), 6 U.L.A. (pt. I) 163-64, 169 (2001).
58. Cf. Dent, supra note 5, at 93-94 ("The power to dissolve without fiduciary restrictions invites
opportunism.").
59. Blair, supra note 56, at 388 ("The phrase 'lock-in,' when used in the context of corporate law,
generally has a negative meaning, suggesting the dreaded fate of a minority shareholder in a closely
held corporation who cannot sell her shares (perhaps because there are restrictions on stock sales, or
perhaps because there is just no market for such shares), and cannot compel the corporation to pay
out any of its income or assets to shareholders."). For a similar idea in the strategic alliance context,
see Dent, supra note 5, at 95-96 ("The opposite of the problem of opportunistic termination is lock-in:
a party who wants to exit a venture may be unable either to dissolve the venture or to sell its interest
therein.").
60. For an excellent discussion of the benefits of lock-in in the corporate setting, see Edward B.
Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Op-
pression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 918-20 (1999). "For at least the Silicon Valley
start-up, the explanation for the choice of form is an operational factor: the need to lock-in parties
while developing vulnerable match-specific assets. Reduced agency costs are the result rather than the
cause." Id. at 919.
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choosing and to be paid the value of their shares.61 As one would expect
in such a circumstance, shareholders often contract for exit rights
through buy-sell agreements, 2 which take various forms but generally
entitle a shareholder to sell her shares back to the corporation (or an-
other shareholder) upon her departure. This is the corporate version of
at-will dissolution, and it is usually limited by date or event restrictions.
In the absence of contractual exit rights, minority shareholders
might still obtain liquidity under the law of minority oppression.63
Whether implemented by statute or by common-law decision, the law of
minority oppression usually requires dissolution of the corporation or
buyout of the minority shareholder when events suggest that the majority
shareholder is acting opportunistically. 4
As noted above, alliance partners are not subject to default rules.
The termination structure of alliances is entirely contractual, and as we
would expect, alliance partners often strive to obtain the benefits of lock
in without constructing a suicide pact.6' Most alliances have termination
provisions that are tied to the completion of a specified undertaking.
Prior to that event, the partners may exit only "for cause," a term that
typically includes breach of the alliance agreement and may include
other events.
If those were the only termination provisions, the exit structure of
alliances would look very much like a partnership for term or a closely
held corporation subject to the law of minority oppression. Another
method of exit that is commonly employed in alliances, however, is exit
via deadlock. This exit strategy is implemented through the contractual
board.
IV. THE CONTRACTUAL BOARD
Many alliances of the type discussed in this article have contractu-
ally constituted management committees comprised of representatives of
61. Margaret Blair contends that this feature-which she describes as "the ability to commit
capital, once amassed, for extended periods of time-for decades and even centuries"-was crucial to
the development of the corporate form in the eighteenth century United States. Blair, supra note 56,
at 390.
62. Andrew P. Campbell & Caroline Smith Gidiere, Shareholder Rights, the Tort of Oppression
and Derivative Actions Revisited: A Time for Mature Development?, 63 ALA. LAW. 315, 316-17 (2002)
("Professional firms and other corporations frequently use such buy/sell agreements that essentially
create a private market and give the minority shareholder an out in the event of a falling out or dis-
agreement with the majority shareholder.").
63. F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS § 1.05 (2d ed. 2003).
64. Robert C. Art, Shareholder Rights and Remedies in Close Corporations: Oppression, Fiduci-
ary Duties, and Reasonable Expectations, 28 J. CORP. L. 371,402-05 (2003).
65. While it is not uncommon for an alliance agreement to be terminable at the will of the larger
party, that right typically requires substantial forewarning. For a recent example, consider the Exclu-
sive License and Collaboration Agreement between MedImmune, Inc. and Critical Therapeutics, Inc.,
July 30, 2003, at § 10.2 [hereinafter Critical Alliance Agreement] (on file with the University of Illinois
Law Review), which provides that MedImmune has the right to terminate on six months notice.
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each alliance partner. This institution is somewhat enigmatic and has
gone largely unexplored by alliance scholars. Rachelle Sampson suggests
two functions for such institutions: (1) improved information flow and
(2) improved coordination on strategic-level decisions by forcing consen-
sus.66 This section describes the usual structure of the contractual board
and explores its possible functions.
In the paradigmatic alliance comprised of two alliance partners,
each partner appoints several representatives to a management commit-
tee, but regardless of the number of committee members, each alliance
partner has one vote.67 A recent strategic alliance agreement between
Memory Pharmaceuticals and Hoffman-LaRoche is illustrative.' Mem-
ory is a biotechnology company that develops pharmaceutical drug can-
didates to treat neurological disorders, such as Alzheimer's disease.69
Several of its drug candidates are currently in clinical development, and
it has forged alliances with Hoffman-LaRoche, one of the world's largest
pharmaceutical companies, to facilitate this development.7" The alliance
is governed by a "Joint Liaison Team" (JLT) comprised of five members,
three of which are to be designated by Memory and two of which are to
be designated by Hoffman-LaRoche." Despite the imbalanced represen-
tation, the agreement provides that "[d]ecisions of the JLT shall be by
consensus, with each Party having one collective vote."72
Most alliance agreements assign a variety of tasks to the contractual
board. The unifying theme of these provisions is the need to fill gaps in
the alliance agreement as the relationship matures. The Memory Alli-
ance Agreement, for example, delegates to the JLT the tasks of prepar-
ing development plans, supervising the progress of the alliance, "recom-
66. Sampson, supra note 6, at 484-85.
67. Josh Lerner and Rob Merges suggest that bargaining power disparities might account for
circumstances in which one party gains outright control over the management board. Lerner &
Merges, supra note 1, at 136 (discussing a joint venture between Ciba-Geigy and ALZA).
68. Strategic Alliance Agreement, among F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., a Swiss corporation,
Hoffman-La Roche Inc., a New Jersey corporation, and Memory Pharmaceuticals Corp., a Delaware
corporation, Aug. 19, 2003, [hereinafter Memory Alliance Agreement] (on file with the University of
Illinois Law Review).
69. Prospectus of Memory Pharmaceuticals Corp., Apr. 5, 2004, at 3 (on file with the University
of Illinois Law Review).
70. Id. at F-16.
71. Memory Alliance Agreement, supra note 68, at § 7.2(a).
72. Id. § 7.2(c). A recent alliance between Pfizer Inc. and Eyetech Pharmaceuticals. Inc. displays
a similar governance structure:
In order to fulfill the objectives of this Agreement, the Parties agree to establish a Joint Op-
erating Committee (JOC), a Commercialization Subcommittee (CSC), a Clinical Develop-
ment/Regulatory Subcommittee (CDRSC), and a Manufacturing Subcommittee (MSC), and such
other committees and subcommittees as may be established by mutual consent of Eyetech and
Pfizer. Each committee and subcommittee shall have two co-chairpersons, one designated by
each of Eyetech and Pfizer. All decisions of the committees and subcommittees shall be by a vote
of the co-chairpersons, each co-chairperson having one vote, and all decisions shall be by unani-
mous consent of the co-chairpersons.
Collaboration Agreement by and between Pfizer Inc. and Eyetech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., December
17, 2002, at § 3.1 [hereinafter Eyetech Alliance Agreement] (on file with the University of Illinois Law
Review).
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mending actions in response to unforeseen events, [and] supervising the
transition of development and manufacturing activities from Memory to
Roche and development of preclinical and clinical strategies (including
clinical candidate selection, the commencement of the Initiation of Phase
I and the Initiation of Phase lIa)."73 From the standpoint of the original
negotiators of the alliance agreement, these sorts of decisions are unfa-
thomable because they depend on events that occur subsequent to the
formation of the alliance.
The open-textured nature of the JLT's authorization is typical of
other alliance agreements. The following is a provision from the recent
alliance agreement of MedImmune, Inc. and Critical Therapeutics, Inc.:
The Committee will (i) provide guidance regarding Develop-
ment of Products, including the review of Product Development
plans, (ii) make decisions regarding the Research Plan for the De-
velopment of Products for each Indication, and regarding the re-
spective roles of each Party in the Development of Products, (iii)
address such other matters as either Party may bring before the
Committee, (iv) perform such other tasks and undertake such other
responsibilities as may be set forth in this Agreement, and (v) at-
tempt to resolve any disputes relating to this Agreement that may
arise between the Parties.74
In addition to composing the contractual board and allocating to it
various responsibilities, most alliances agreements require the board to
meet on a periodic basis, usually at least semiannually or quarterly." As
noted above, any decisions of the board made at these meetings must be
unanimous, thus presenting, in a two-partner alliance, the possibility of
deadlock. Of course, the parties recognize this possibility, and alliance
agreements routinely provide for dispute resolution in the event of dead-
lock. The usual provision in such cases involves referral from the com-
mittee to senior officers of the respective partners, who are charged with
bridging the gap. In the event that the tate-A-tete fails to resolve the mat-
ter, the alliance agreements either allocate decision making authority to
one of the parties or send the matter directly to arbitration. The Mem-
ory Alliance Agreement takes the first tack:
If the JLT is unable to decide a matter by consensus, the Par-
ties shall refer such matter for resolution to the Head of Global Re-
search or the Head of Global Development on behalf of Roche and
the Chief Scientific Officer of Memory ("Alliance Executives"). If
the Alliance Executives are unable to resolve any such matter after
73. Memory Alliance Agreement, supra note 68, at § 7.2.
74. Critical Alliance Agreement, supra note 65, at § 2.1.01.
75. See, e.g., Memory Alliance Agreement, supra note 68, at § 7.2(b) (requiring semiannual
meetings, but allowing the parties to change the frequency by mutual agreement); Critical Alliance
Agreement, supra note 65, at § 2.1.02 (requiring quarterly meetings); Eyetech Alliance Agreement,
supra note 72, at § 3.2 (providing for meetings "quarterly, or as otherwise requested by one of the Par-
ties").
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good faith discussions, then the final decision shall rest with Mem-
ory.
76
Although the parties appear to have provided a straightforward so-
lution to deadlock, the agreement also contains an arbitration provision
triggered by "[a]ny dispute, controversy or claim ('Dispute') arising out
of or in relation to this Agreement, or the breach, termination or invalid-
ity thereof, that cannot be settled amicably by the Parties after a good
faith discussion to resolve the Dispute by the appropriate officers of the
Parties."77 These two provisions seem to be in direct conflict, the one
providing that Memory has ultimate decision making power and the
other requiring arbitration of any disputes that remain unresolved after
the senior officers have had their turn. While the former appears to ap-
ply only to a subset of disputes (i.e., disputes within the JLT), the JLT
decision making power is expansive enough that the subset might con-
sume close to the whole set of alliance disputes.7 8
Many other alliances take a more direct route to arbitration. For
example, an alliance between BioNumerik Pharmaceuticals, Inc., a Texas
corporation that recently filed documents with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission in preparation for an initial public offering, and
ASTA Medica Aktiengesellschaft, a German corporation, contained the
following provision: "If [a] matter is not resolved by the Alliance Steer-
ing Committee representatives of BioNumerik and ASTA Medica within
60 days after the commencement of... discussions, either Party may re-
quest, in writing, that the matter be resolved by binding arbitra-
1179tion ....
At first glance, the contractual boards created by many alliance
agreements bear a resemblance to boards of directors in the corporate
context. Just as modem corporation statutes provide broad authority to
corporate boards to manage the corporation's affairs,8" alliance agree-
ments usually give contractual boards expansive authority to manage the
development of the alliance. Unlike most corporate boards, however,
the contractual boards are constructed to facilitate deadlock. That the
76. Memory Alliance Agreement, supra note 68, at § 7.2(c). See also Critical Alliance Agree-
ment, supra note 65, at § 2.1.03 (providing that any issues not resolved by negotiation will be decided
by the Chief Executive Officer of MedImmne).
77. Memory Alliance Agreement, supra note 68, at § 17.
78. Interestingly, the Critical Alliance Agreement also contains an arbitration provision that
would seem to apply if the negotiation at the senior officer level failed:
The Parties shall negotiate in good faith and use reasonable efforts to settle any dispute,
controversy or claim arising from or related to this Agreement or the breach thereof. If the Par-
ties do not fully settle, and a Party wishes to pursue the matter, each such dispute, controversy or
claim shall be finally resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the Commercial Arbitra-
tion Rules and Supplementary Procedures for Large Complex Disputes of the American Arbitra-
tion Association ('AAA'), and judgment on the arbitration award may be entered in any court
having jurisdiction thereof.
Critical Alliance Agreement, supra note 65, at § 11.6.01.
79. Strategic Alliance Agreement between ASTA Metica Aktiengesellschaft and Bionumerik
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Jan. 18, 2001, at § 3.5 (on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
80. Del. Gen. Corp. L. tit. 8 § 141(a) (1999); Mod. Bus. Corp. Act Ann. § 8.30 (2002).
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parties count this a real possibility is clear from the fact that the alliance
agreements describe processes to resolve deadlocks.
What are we to make of these provisions? The ultimate answer to
this question will require more detailed empirical investigation, but the
structure of the agreements evokes several possibilities. Under the
elaborate, multistage, dispute resolution process, four outcomes are pos-
sible: (1) the partners could resolve the dispute at the committee level;
(2) the partners could resolve the dispute at the senior officer level; (3)
the partners could resolve the dispute by reference to the contractually
designated decision maker; or (4) the parties could take their dispute to
arbitration. Of course, the existence of a series of procedures may itself
encourage early resolution. For example, the lower-level officers who
staff the contractual board might be reluctant to refer matters to their
senior officers on the theory that such a referral is evidence of failure.
Also, the prospect of arbitration and separation may not be attractive in
a surplus producing alliance, thus encouraging vigilant negotiations.
All of this begs the question: Why create a committee to do this
work? Most contractual relationships are managed at the firm level by a
single employee (the contract manager) or a small group of employees
whose existence is never acknowledged in the written agreement. They
are not required to meet with representatives of the counterparty
(though they might), and they are given no express authority within the
body of the contract to make decisions affecting the relationship (though
they may be given such authority by their employer). In short, they are
invisible to the reader of the express contract. That alliance partners feel
the need to create a contractual board, define its authority, specify its
regular meetings, and provide decision making and dispute resolution
rules is suggestive of a different purpose.
The contractual board provides one supremely important advantage
over the contract manager: exit without breach. This advantage turns on
a critical aspect of alliances, namely, that opportunistic behavior is ex-
traordinarily difficult to police via contract. If one alliance partner is
chiseling, the other party may know it but may not be able to prove that
the behavior constitutes a breach of the alliance agreement.81 Faced with
such a circumstance, a contract manager is in a difficult position. She
may be able to persuade the counterparty that opportunistic behavior is
immoral, unprofitable, or unwise, but without the possibility of at-will
dissolution, she will be helpless to force a change by any means short of
retaliatory opportunism, which could backfire if later found to constitute
a breach of the alliance agreement.
An alliance partner, by contrast, can use the contractual board to its
advantage. The board is both required to meet and delegated authority
81. Economists would describe this state of affairs using the rather awkward phrasing of ob-
servability without verifiability.
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to make certain decisions. In most instances, that delegation is broad
enough to provide the alliance partners with the flexibility to address op-
portunistic behavior. By forcing a decision at the committee level, a stra-
tegic partner may curtail opportunism before it has a chance to do sub-
stantial damage to the alliance. Even if the problem is not resolved at
the committee level, reputational forces or the desire to maintain a pro-
ductive alliance may pressure the opportunistic party to resolve the dis-
pute at the senior officer level. And if that fails, the complaining partner
either imposes its will on the other partner (if the complaining partner
has been assigned ultimate decision making power) or exits through arbi-
tration.
Under this view, one of the key advantages of alliances over part-
nerships or corporations is that the partners have a built-in check against
opportunism. An alliance partner who feels put upon has the power to
force deadlock, which triggers a substantial process that is capable of ad-
dressing the opportunistic behavior or providing a means of exit.
V. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the biggest challenge confronting scholars who study con-
tractual structure is the inevitable heterogeneity produced by private or-
dering.82 This article relies on the empirical observations of others re-
garding patterns of behavior among alliance participants. 83 This general
approach is well-known in transaction-cost economics.'
The structural feature of alliances that is most interesting for pre-
sent purposes is the contractual board. Such boards are an important
vehicle for discovering and disseminating information about the activities
of the alliance. Moreover, these institutions offer decision making capac-
ity in a highly fluid environment. In addition to these commonly recog-
nized roles, however, contractual boards also play a somewhat surprising
role in the exit structure of many alliances: They serve as a means of exit
without breach.
82. For an interesting exploration of heterogeneity in the alliance context, see Jeffrey J. Reuer &
Africa Arifio, Contractual Heterogeneity in Strategic Alliances (Nov. 13, 2002) (Working Paper No.
482).
83. As noted by de Rond, "despite the idiosyncrasy of alliances, there is order." DE ROND, supra
note 3, at 4.
84. For examples of such efforts in the strategic alliance context, see Richmond D. Mathews,
Strategic Alliances, Equity Stakes, and Entry Deterrence (Working Paper, Dec. 8, 2003) (examining
equity ownership in alliances) (Working Paper on file with the University of Illinois Law Review).
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